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The traditional relationship between lawyer and client
should be retained in ethical rules.

By Monroe H. Freedman
THE provisions of the proposed Model
Rules of Professional Conduct relating
to confidentiality will seriously impair,
if not destroy, the traditional relationship between lawyer and client. Let me
explain why that is so by reviewing the
status of confidentiality in the current
American Bar Association ethical
standards and in Supreme Court decisions, and by showing how the model
rules would radically change our traditional standards and values.
Whether serving as counselor or as
advocate, the lawyer must establish a
relationship of trust and confidence
with the client. Only through that relationship can the lawyer learn all the
relevant facts, determine which are important and which are helpful or harmful, and give the client professional
judgment and representation. If the
client were to withhold information
that might be relevant, the lawyer could
not effectively serve the client's needs.
Accordingly, the lawyer must be able to
assure the client that confidences will
be inviolate in all but the most unusual
and extreme circumstances.
Although that statement of the
lawyer-client relationship emphasizes
the interests of the individual client, it
is in fact the public interest that is
thereby served in a free society. Even an
intelligent and informed lay person is
unable to cope with the complexities of
the law without professional advice
and assistance. The traditional lawyerclient relationship enhances individual
autonomy by increasing the client's
knowledge of the lawful choices available. In addition, the ideal of equality
before the law is served by giving professional assistance to each person who
needs it.
The public interest also is furthered
by trust between lawyer and client because it puts the lawyer in a position to
give advice that is socially desirable. As
every lawyer knows, the client who
may be tempted to commit a crime or
fraud or other wrongful act often can be
dissuaded by professional counsel, but
only if the lawyer knows the facts on
which to base that counsel.
No rule of law, no matter how funIllustration by Dick Mlodock

damental, has ever been unwavering or
free of ambiguities, and the protection
of lawyer-client confidences is no exception. The professional ideal of confidentiality is clear, however, and the
trend towards increasingly strict protection is manifest in professional
standards and opinions.
At least as long ago as 1833 the English common law recognized that confidentiality is essential to enable clients
to obtain professional advice. In 1914
Mechem in his work on agency expressed the same view, adding that divulgence of a confidence by a lawyer
not only wouldbe "a gross violation of
a sacred trust" but would "utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and
benefits to be derived from professional
assistance."

Early canons
of ethics
were ambiguous
The A.B.A.'s Canons of Professional
Ethics, as adopted in 1908, expressly
protected clients' "secrets or confidences" in Canon 6. In 1928 Canon 37
was added to explain the lawyer's
"duty to preserve his clients confidences," and that provision was made
even more emphatic in 1937.
The canons, however, were ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. In addition to express protection of confidences and secrets, they included a future crime exception (Canon 37), proscribed "any manner of fraud or
chicane" (Canon 15), required candor
to the court (Canon 22), and required
the attorney to reveal fraud to the other
party (Canon 41) and perjury to the
prosecuting authorities (Canon 29).
What, then, was the lawyer's obligation
if a client was a fugitive from justice,
jumped bail, violated parole, or committed perjury?
The formal opinions of the A.B.A
Committee on Professional Ethics that
attempted to resolve those issues (23,
155, 156, and 268) were in conflict until
1953. Then, in Opinion 287, the committee resolved the conflicts in favor of
confidentiality, holding specifically

that an attorney who learns that a client
has committed perjury in securing a divorce should advise the client to inform
the court but should not reveal the truth
if the client fails to do so.
Referring expressly to "the duty of
candor and fairness to the court" and
the canons requiring disclosure of
fraud and perjury, Opinion 287 found
those canons to be "[insufficient] to
override the purpose, policy, and express obligation [of confidentiality]
under Canon 37." The opinion concluded: "We yield to none in our insistence on the lawyer's loyalty to the
court of which he is an officer. Such
loyalty does not, however, consist
merely of respect for the judicial office
and candor and frankness to the judge.
It involves the steadfast maintenance of
the principles which the courts themselves have evolved for the effective
administration of justice, one of the
most firmly established of which is the
preservation undisclosed of the confidences communicated by his clients to
the lawyer in his professional capacity."
As originally drafted, the Code of
Professional Responsibility appeared to
revive the ambiguities of the canons.
The code recognizes in Ethical Consideration 4-1 that confidentiality is essential to the traditional lawyer-client relationship, but the 1969 version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) appears also to
require disclosure of clients' fraud.
That rule contains two clauses relating
to fraud by a client on a person or tribunal. The first clause (presenting no
problem) requires that the lawyer
"promptly call upon his client to rectify
the [fraud]." However, the second
clause reads: "and if the client refuses
or is unable to do so, [the lawyer] shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal."
The Bar Association of the District of
Columbia immediately and overwhelmingly deleted the second clause,
which appears to require disclosure of
client fraud. The A.B.A. House of Delegates took similar action in 1974, by
adding a third clause to D.R. 7-102
(B)(1). As a result of that amendment,
the attorney is now called on to reveal
April, 1982 * Volume 68
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the client's fraud "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication." If construed broadly,
of course, the third clause, which forbids disclosure, swallows up the second clause, which appears to require
disclosure.
That is just what happened. In Opinion 341 (1975) the A.B.A. Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility
held that the amendment to D.R.
7-102(B)(1) protects not only "confidences" but also "secrets" of the client.
"Secrets," according to D.R. 4-101(A),
include "information... the disclosure
of which will be embarrassing ... to the
client." In the words of Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., reporter for the commission
that produced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the amendment to
D.R. 7-102(B)(1) "eviscerated the duty
to report fraud" (Ethics in the Proctice
of Law, page 27).
As explained in Opinion 341, the effect of the amendment of D.R.
7-102(B)(1) is to "reinstate the essence
of Opinion 287"-that is, confidentiality "is so important that it should take
precedence in all but the most serious
cases." Opinion 341 acknowledges that
"the conflicting duties to reveal fraud
and to preserve confidences have
existed side-by-side for some time" but
adds that "it is clear that there has long
been an accommodation in favor of preserving confidences." Opinion 341 relies on "tradition. .. backed by substantial policy considerations" to preserve the lawyer-client relationship of
trust and confidence.
The bar's traditional position on
lawyer-client confidences is an integral
part of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
For example, in Upjohn Company v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, quoted with approval
the language of E.C. 4-1: "A lawyer
should be fully informed of all the facts
of the matter he is handling in order for
his client to obtain the full advantage of
our legal system. It is for the lawyer in
the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and the important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observation
of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to
hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the
full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but
also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance."
430

Note that the quoted language relates
the ethical obligation of confidentiality
to what is "essential to proper representation." Dissenting in United States v.
Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), Justice
Rehnquist explicitly said that "the
Sixth Amendment, of course, protects
the confidentiality of communications
between the accused and his attorney."
Chief Justice Burger observed in
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980), that the lawyer-client privilege
rests on the need for the lawyer -not
only as advocate, but also as counselor
-to know everything that relates to the
client's reasons for seeking representation, and that the privilege is therefore
rooted in "the imperative need" for
confidence and trust between lawyer
and client. Without that confidence and
*trust and the full communication that
flows from it, the lawyer cannot provide effective assistance of counsel.
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Model rules fail
to "clearly differentiate
right from wrong"
With regard to the Fifth Amendment,
the Supreme Court held in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), that
the attorney-client privilege applies to
documents in the hands of an attorney
that would have been privileged in the
hands of the client. As stated in
Whitebread's treatise on criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has "extended Fifth Amendment protection to
the attorney-client privilege for the express purpose of encouraging the uninhibited exchange of information between citizens and their attorneys."
The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct nevertheless would require
the lawyer to divulge a client's confidences to a tribunal (Rule 3.3) and to
third parties (Rule 4.1) in order to correct deliberate falsehoods, unintentional falsehoods, and deliberately misleading omissions by the client. In addition, divulgence is permitted in a variety of circumstances under Rule 1.6.
Those provisions are inconsistent with
the traditional lawyer-client relationship and would reverse the trend of
authority expressed in the old Canons
of Professional Ethics, in A.B.A. Opinions 287 and 341, and in the 1974
amendment to D.R. 7-102(B)(1) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
The obligations of disclosure would
not simply prevent the lawyer from
going forward with a client who is

committing a fraud. Withdrawal from
the representation is not sufficient to
satisfy the express requirements of
Rules 3.3(a)(2) and 4.1(b) that the lawyer "shall not knowingly fail to disclose the client's confidences to the tribunal and to third persons."
That conclusion is clouded by some
inconsistent drafting in Rule 3.3(a).
Subsection (2) of that rule unambiguously requires "disclosure of a fact
necessary to prevent a fraud on a tribunal," while Subsection (4) of the
same rule says only that the lawyer
shall take "reasonable remedial measures." The comment explains "remedial measures" to mean that "ordinarily" the lawyer should make prompt
disclosure to the court. Thus, Rule
.3(a)(2) stipulates disclosure as the
sole required course, while Subsection
(4) of the same rule makes disclosure
the ordinary course but not the exclusive one. Neither the rule nor its comment explains what other courses
might be embraced by "reasonable remedial measures." In view of the mandatory language of Rule 3.3(a)(2), therefore, the lawyer who failed to violate a
client's confidences would act at his or
her peril.
The inconsistency between Subsections (2) and (4) of Rule 3.3(a) is only
one illustration of the failure of the
model rules to "clearly differentiate
right from wrong" and to tell lawyers
"exactly what they ought to do," as
promised in 1979 by Robert J. Kutak,
chairman of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. A more
serious failure of that sort is the "caveat" to Rule 3.3, which cautions that
constitutional law defining the right to
assistance of counsel in criminal cases
"may" supersede the obligations imposed by the rule. Thereby, the model
rules leave the lawyer whipsawed between the threat of disciplinary action
for failing to disclose confidences and a
charge of ineffective assistance and
malpractice for doing so.
Nor are the notes to Rule 3.3 either
adequate or helpful. They suggest that
"the general constitutional theory applied by the Supreme Court" favors divulgence of clients' confidences by the
attorney. As shown above, however,
that conclusion is wrong. In addition,
the notes fail to cite the most important
cases bearing on the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The two Supreme Court cases that are
cited are characterized in a misleading
way and do not support a rule requiring

dences' as defined in D.R. 4-101(A)."
The essential point of Opinion 341,
however, is that the 1974 amendment
was not limited to "confidences" but
went far beyond to protect "secrets" as
well. Elsewhere the model rules simply
omit reference to Opinion 341, even
when it is highly material to the comment.
The most effective way to inhibit or
plained in Opinion 341, however, that destroy a relationship of trust and conapparent requirement of disclosure was fidence would be to require the lawyer
the result of an oversight in drafting to admonish a client that any disclothat was corrected by the A.B.A's sures made to the lawyer might have to
House of Delegates eight years ago. Mr. be disclosed to others despite injury to
Kutak then says that "some jurisdic- the client. That has been characterized
tions" (omitting any reference to the by Professor Hazard as a "Miranda
A.B.A. itself) have amended the Code of warning." He has noted that the legal
Professional Responsibility to protect effect of the Miranda warning may have
"privileged" information. "But," he far-reaching consequences, for to give it
adds, "'privilege' is undefined and the is to treat the client as a nonclient.
But Rule 1.2(e) of the model rules reamendment has served largely to foster
confusion." Mr. Kutak fails to inform quires a lawyer-client Miranda warnthe reader that Opinion 341 has long ing. The rule is unclear and unsatisfacsince resolved any confusion by defin- tory as to when the warning should be
ing "privileged" extremely broadly to given, but, laying that aside, the proinclude "secrets," thereby protecting vision is wholly inconsistent with the
even information that would be embar- traditional lawyer-client relationship of
rassing to the client.
trust and confidence. At the same time,
The comments and notes to the we must recognize that deletion of that
model rules are similarly misleading. provision would not solve the problem.
Despite extensive citations of only In view of the broad disclosure promarginally useful authorities, they con- visions of the model rules, elemental
tain no reference to Opinion 287 and fairness requires that the client be put
only one to Opinion 341. That one ref- on notice that the lawyer would be reerence is erroneous. It reads: "A.B.A. quired or permitted to betray confiFormal Opinion 341 (1975) construed dences. Indeed, there is, again, a conthe term 'privilege' to include 'confi- stitutional aspect to the issue.

divulgence of confidences by the criminal defense lawyer.
The commission also fails to live up
to its own standards of candor in other
important respects. Writing in this
Journal last September (page 1116), for
example, Mr.Kutak has stated that D.R.
7-102(B) "requires disclosure of every
unrectified fraud committed by a client
in the course of representation." As ex-

House to Consider Model Rules of Professional Conduct
* In January the A.B.A. House of Delegates voted to accept the "restatement"
format for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed by the Commission on the Evaluation of Professional
Standards. The commission now plans to
submit its final draft for consideration by
the House of Delegates in August at the
1982 annual meeting in San Francisco.
The final draft was published as a special
pullout section of the October, 1981,
issue of the American Bar Association
Journal.
The House Special Committee on
Hearings has requested that all interested
individuals and groups submit to it in
writing any specific amendments or opposing positions that are proposed for
presentation to the House in August. The
Rules of Procedure of the House of Delegates require that "all motions to amend
recommendations must be in writing,
unless the amendment contains six or
less words." All documents should be
received at the American Bar Center in

Chicago no later than June 9, and they
should be addressed to Judith W. Smith,
Office of Policy Administration, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637 (telephone
3121947-3932). As soon as possible after
June 9, a compilation of all amendments
and position statements submitted will
be forwarded to all who submitted documents and to the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards.
The House Committee on Hearings has
decided tentatively to hold hearings first
in Chicago about June 25 and again in
San Francisco on Friday, August 6, to
gain information that may assist it and
the House Committee on Rules and
Calendar in an orderly presentation to
the House by identifying controversial
areas. In some instances different groups
may propose amendments that seek to
achieve the same goal, and these groups
may be able to reach agreement on a coordinated presentation in advance of the
two scheduled hearings.

For example, in United States v.
Henry a government informer was
placed in a cell with Henry and established a "relationship of trust and confidence" with him. As a result, Henry
revealed incriminating information to
the informer. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, the Supreme Court held
that because Henry's conviction was
based in part on the admissions elicited
through the false relationship of trust
and confidence, it violated Henry's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Also significant is the recent decision
inEstelle v. Smith, 451 U.S 454 (1981).
There a psychiatrist examined the defendant regarding his competency to
stand trial. The defendant was not advised of his privilege against selfincrimination, nor was his lawyer informed of the examination. After conviction and in a separate penalty phase
of the trial, the psychiatrist testified
that the defendant was dangerous.
Chief Justice Burger again wrote the
opinion for the Court. He noted that
during the psychiatric evaluation, the
defendant "assuredly... was 'not in
the presence of [a person] acting solely
in his interest.'" Rather, the psychiatrist's apparent role of neutrality
changed, and he became at the sentencing trial "an agent of the state recounting unwarned statements" made in a
postarrest custodial setting. Accordingly, the defendant's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated, and the sentence was vacated.
Clearly, a lawyer cannot do what the
cellmate in Henry and the psychiatrist
in Estelle could not do-that is, establish an apparent relationship of trust
and confidence, elicit harmful information, and then disclose the information
contrary to the client's interests and desires.
Having required disclosure of client
confidences, the model rules, of necessity, require a Miranda warning. But
that admonition comes at the cost of
treating the client as a "nonclient." In
its 1980 discussion draft, the Kutak
commission acknowledged that such a
warning "may lead the client to withhold or falsify relevant facts, thereby
making the lawyer's representation
...less effective."
That candid
acknowledgment has been omitted
from the present draft, but the omission
only conceals the rule's effect without
changing it.
The current fad for requiring lawyers
to divulge confidences has received
substantial impetus from consumer advocates. Concerned with scandals inApril, 1982 * Volume 68

431

volving unsafe automobiles, hazardous
wastes, dangerous drugs, and corporate
bribery, some of them have urged that
an effective way to police abuses would
be to require corporate lawyers to be
"whistle-blowers." The proponents of
whistle-blowing generally reject the
argument that it would impair the basic
rights of individuals. They insist that
the whistle-blowing requirement
should be imposed only on lawyers for
corporations, as. distinguished from
lawyers representing individuals.
Ironically, the Kutak commission has
turned that notion upside-down. While
lawyers representing individuals are
required to make disclosures in many
instances and permitted to make them
in many more, lawyers representing
business organizations are absolutely
forbidden under Rule 1.13(b) and (c), in
virtually all circumstances, to reveal
even ongoing and future crimes. Assume, for example, a case in which an
automobile manufacturer is being sued
for substantial damages for marketing a
car with a gasoline tank that is allegedly defective in design and has frequently exploded, causing numerous
deaths. The company's lawyer learns
that tests had been performed by the
company, prior to production of the
car, showing that the gasoline tank was
dangerous. After commencement of the
litigation, however, the company's vice
president for design destroyed all evidence of the tests and then testified that
there had been fone.
Rules 3.3(a) and 4.1 would require
the attorney to reveal the truth to the
court and to the other parties. Not so in
this case, however, because Rules 3.3
and 4.1 are governed by Rule 1.13 when
a corporate official is involved. As
stated in the comment to Rule 1.13: "To
guide his conduct under Rule ... 3.3 or
4.1 ....
the lawyer ordinarily should

make inquiry within the organization
as indicated in Rule 1.13(b)."
Professor Hazard said in a panel discussion at the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools last January that Rule 1.13 is not intended to
govern in situations in which Rules 3.3
or 4.1 are involved. That informal oral
explanation, however, is clearly inconsistent with the text of the rule and with
the official written comment, which
have not been amended or disavowed
by the Kutak commission.
Under Rule 1.13 the attorney in our
example must first "know" (not just
"believe") that the vice president for
design is acting unlawfully and also
that his unlawful act is "likely to result
432
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in material injury to the organization."
That is not likely in our case, but suppose the lawyer somehow knows that
exposure of the obstruction of justice
and perjury is likely, and that a substantial penalty against the company
also is likely. The lawyer still must not
reveal the truth but must proceed as is
"reasonably necessary in the best interests of the organization," giving "due
consideration to the seriousness of the
violation and its consequences, the
scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation
of the person involved,- [and] the
policies of the organization." The lawyer also must act so as to "minimize
disruption of the organization and the
risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside
the organization." Even with all that
hedging, the lawyer is not permitted to
reveal the truth but is limited to asking
the vice president to reconsider his act,
advising a separate legal opinion, and
referring the matter to higher authority
within the organization.

Model rules would
seriously impair the
lawyer-client relationship
Assume now that the matter is referred to the board of directors, which
decides that the truth is not likely to
come out and directs the lawyer to remain silent. The lawyer then must determine whether two more conditions
have been met: first, that the board has
"clearly" committed a violation of a
legal obligation to the organization or a
violation of law that reasonably might
be imputed to the organization; and
second, the board's action is likely to
result in substantial injury to the company. In that event, the lawyer still may
not reveal the truth unless he is reasonable in believing three more things:
first, that divdlgence is "necessary" in
the best interest of the company; second, that the board has acted to further
the personal or financial interests of the
board members; and third, that those
personal or financial interests of the
board members are in conflict with the
interests of the company.
Only after meeting all those extraordinarily unlikely conditions is the lawyer permitted, but never required, to
divulge the truth to the court or the
other parties about the vice president's
obstruction of justice and perjury. A
more direct and honest drafting of Rule

1.13 would say simply: "The provisions of these rules requiring or permitting divulgence of a client's confidences shall not apply to a lawyer representing a business organization."
The model rules' provisions on client
confidences are radical, poorly drafted,
misleading, inconsistent, and unconstitutional. They would seriously impair, if not destroy, the traditional
lawyer-client relationship of trust and
confidence, reversing the clear trend of
A.B.A. ethical rules and formal opinions; they would require that a
"Miranda warning" be given by the
lawyer to the client, in violation of tradition, common sense, and constitutional law; they would carve out an inconsistent exception for lawyers representing business organizations; and
they are based on seriously flawed and
misleading scholarship, including
misstatements and omissions of important authorities.
The disclosure provisions are based
on the fact that lawyers know a good
deal of relevant truth and on the notion
that the legal system will produce more
truth if lawyers are required to divulge
it. The fatal fallacy of that notion is that
as soon as clients learn that their confidences are not safe with their lawyers,
the lawyers will no longer have many
truths worth divulging.
In sum, clients would come to understand that any truths that might be
harmful to them could not be entrusted
to their lawyers. The result would be
what is known as "intentional" or
"selective ignorance" on the part of the
lawyer. As recently as 1979 that approach was denounced by the A:B.A.
House of Delegates as "most egregious"
and as constituting a "professional impropriety" advocated by "unscrupuluous lawyers" when it approved the
Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function.
The provisions of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct relating to client
confidences-Rules 1.2(e), 1.6, 1.12(b)
and (c), 2.3, and 4.1(b)-should be rejected and the traditional relationship
between lawyer and client should be
maintained.
(Monroe H. Freedman is a professor
of law at Hofstra University and of
counsel to Orenstein Snitow Sutak and
Pollack, P.C. He is the author of Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System
(1975) and was reporterfor the American Lawyers' Code of Conduct, a project of the Roscoe Pound/American Trial
Lawyers Foundations.)
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